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There is a widespread belief among economists  and policymakers that, while formal
trade barriers may have been reduced greatly in recent years, there may be growing
barriers –whether intentional or unintentional- resulting from the imposition by nation
states and by international blocs of technical regulations on product safety, labelling,
environmental emissions, hygiene and the like. It is increasingly suggested that these
barriers may be being manipulated by national authorities as an alternative, and
potentially costly, way of discriminating against import suppliers in favour of their
domestic industries, and that trade rules need tightening to reduce such protectionism.
 Such a sentiment underlies the Annexes on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) and
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) to the World Trade Organisation
Agreement from the Uruguay Round. The WTO Agreement Annex on TBTs
recognises that countries have legitimate reasons for introducing product regulations,
but that such regulations must not ‘be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a
legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create’.
Attempts to reduce perceived TBTs also underlie the European Union’s Single Market
initiative and several recent trade agreements. Nevertheless, there is still considerable
disagreement between those (particularly developing country lobbyists) who argue
that regulations are still highly obstructive to trade and those who feel countries’
sovereignty and the environment and quality of life of their citizens would be at risk
from loosening regulations.
Looking at this from an economic angle, the case that there may be much hidden
protection embodied in national standards and regulations has been argued
forthrightly by Richard Baldwin and others involved in a current World Bank study
(See Maskus and Wilson reference).  There have also been strong arguments in
support of the idea that the simplest way to reduce such ‘regulatory protection’
barriers is by introducing mutual recognition agreements, where a group of countries
agree that, if goods judged satisfactory for sale by the authorities in their country of
origin, all countries would treat them as acceptable. This mutual recognition principle
effectively underlies much of the legislation underpinning the European Union’s
Single Market and the Asia Pacific Economic Community.
The problem is that economic arguments to back up this increasingly popular policy
prescription have little formal theoretical basis at present. What work has been done
has often been either (i) rather narrow case-studies of technology within individual
industries, (ii) very ad hoc studies based upon the assumption that if two countries
trade less than simple econometric models would indicate, this must be because of
‘regulatory protection’ or (iii) a few very complicated models of product choice.
There are strong reasons to be sceptical about the current literature on ‘regulatory
protection’. For a start, minimum standard regulations are rarely introduced primarily
for protectionist reasons. Rather they serve important purposes in protecting
consumers in cases where there are product compatibility problems (‘network
externalities’ such as the different technical standards for TV or telecoms equipment),
informational problems (so that ‘bad’ suppliers may drive out ‘good’ ones), safety and
disease control issues or issues of monopolistic supply. We cannot always be sure
when such standards are really being distorted in order to benefit one country at the
expense of its trading partners. Nor can we always conclude that such distortions will
be trade-reducing – quite the contrary, it is conceivable that a country may be tempted
to use legislation in such a way that its neighbours are induced to sell it more goods at
lower price. The assumption that such regulations necessarily form large trade barriers
in practice, and that trade fora such as the WTO are the appropriate place to determine
national quality regulations is not really supported by much theoretical analysis.
Against this background, this paper sets out to examine in a more rigorous theoretical
way the issue of quality regulations, particularly minimum quality standards (eg for
safety or reliability) for goods in an open economy, where the motive is to correct an
underprovision of quality by a monopolistic or oligopolistic industry. I show that, on
reasonable assumptions, a monopoly or duopoly will tend to produce goods of less-
than-optimal quality (selling substandard goods is really just another way a monopoly
raises its profit margins). This provides a justification for governments to set
minimum quality standards by regulation benefiting consumers.
The issue then becomes one of how regulators’ choice of standard is affected when an
economy is open to trade. It is shown that when a monopoly supplier is foreign, the
importing country’s government has an incentive to set higher-than-optimal standards,
which induce the foreign company to sell it more goods at a lower price, benefiting
consumers at the expense of profits. This same strategic policy distortion happens
when two countries with one firm in each engage in trade: regulators set higher-than-
optimal product standards, in order to benefit their own consumers at the expense of
foreigners’ profits.
However, an important point arises: these strategic distortions in policymakers’
choice of standards actually increase, rather than reducing, international trade, and do
not necessarily favour one country’s producers over another’s. It follows that, while
policy may not be optimal, it is not protectionist in the sense that it is an obstacle to
trade.
Further, mutual recognition agreements can themselves introduce policy distortions. If
a monopolistic producer in one country can raise its profits by selling substandard
goods to foreigners, then it may benefit its home country to allow it to do so, even if
this also reduces the quality of goods sold at home. It follows that when countries
agree to enter a mutual recognition agreement, regulatory standards, which are set too
high under noncooperation, will become too low.
The paper then looks at what happens when different countries have technological
differences. In this case, it has often been argued that, since when there is imperfect
competition suppliers can make profits on all goods sold, governments have a strong
incentive to introduce regulations which increase their home firms’ share of the local
market at the expense of foreigners. This is called ‘profit-shifting’, and can lead to
protectionism.
While there is some validity in this argument, this paper makes some contrary points
ignored in the existing literature:
1) There is little incentive to use regulatory protection if other, less costly methods of
protection like tariffs are available to policymakers.
2) The analysis in the first part of my paper shows that, in the absence of a mutual
recognition agreement, policymakers have a strong incentive to force up
producers’ quality standards, benefiting consumers at the expense of producers.
This may well leave profit margins much lower than previous studies have
estimated, and as a result the incentives to introduce protectionist barriers for
profit-shifting motives are greatly reduced, or even totally eliminated.
The conclusions of this paper are, therefore, that while there is indeed a problem of
policy biases in setting quality standards on traded goods, this may well not take the
form of protectionism. To assume that such policies may interfere with trade to the
extent that they should be dictated by international trade bodies (rather than by other
forms of international negotiation) may result in excessive interference in countries’
internal policies. Even the current consensus in favour of mutual recognition
agreements may be misplaced in some circumstances.
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Recent trade policy debates have focused increasingly on the sup-
posed barriers caused by di¤ering country regulations, and at proposed
remedies such as mutual recognition agreements. There are several
motives for setting minimum quality standards in an open economy.
This paper examines the motive of correcting an undersupply of qual-
ity when an industry is monopolistic, and sets up a theoretical model
of regulatory setting of minimum vertical quality standards in a classi-
cal two-country cross-hauling duopoly model with identical rms and
consumers. It is shown that, in the absence of cooperation between
the two national regulators, there will be a tendency to strategic over-
regulation, beneting consumers at the expense of rms compared to
the globally optimal solution. This overregulation leads to excessive,
rather than inadequate trade. Further, when a mixture of horizontal
and vertical quality standards is introduced, the prot-shifting in-
centive noted in previous studies to set horizontal technical barriers
to trade which discriminate against foreign suppliers is either greatly
reduced or totally eliminated. It is also noted that the commonly-
supported policy response to technical barriers to trade, mutual recog-
nition, is not socially optimal as previous studies had indicated, but
The author thanks Carlo Perroni at University of Warwick and Paul Brenton at the
World Bank for invaluable comments and suggestions. Any errors are my own.
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instead leads to underregulation, with higher-than-optimal company
prots and lower consumption and trade.
KEYWORDS: Trade, Oligopoly, Regulation
JEL Classication: F13, L13, L51
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Quality standards under classical oligopoly and trade: regulatory protec-
tion or just over-regulation?
T.Huw Edwards, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisa-
tion, Warwick UK.
1 Introduction
This paper examines the issue of quality regulations in an open economy,
where the motive is to correct an underprovision of quality by a monopo-
listic or oligopolistic industry. This motive provides a justication for gov-
ernments to set minimum quality standard regulation, which can be shown
to benet consumers, and which is largely ignored in the current literature.
However, when such regulations are set in an open economy there may well
be distortions in the regulators choice of quality levels (as the existing lit-
erature recognises). In this paper I set up a theoretical partial equilibrium
model, in order to examine the biases in regulatory decisions and the im-
plications for trade. I conclude that when countries do not cooperate there
will be strategic distortions leading to overregulation. However in the rst
simple model I consider, with identical rms, the strategic distortions are not
really protectionist, since the higher quality standards do not reduce trade
volumes. Even in more complicated models where rm characteristics di¤er
across countries, the protectionist motivations are much reduced compared
to the conclusions of other papers. Further, mutual recognition agreements
(such as the European Single Market), which previous studies had indicated
lead to improved welfare, may in fact produce a problem of underregulation.
1.1 Background and Existing Literature
As formal trade barriers have been reduced worldwide,there has been increas-
ing recognition of the importance of Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) -
barriers resulting from a whole raft of national regulations and standards on
labelling, product safety, labour standards, environmental standards and so
on - as a potential form of protectionism. Indeed, the idea that indepen-
dent setting of regulations by EU governments might be hampering trade
and competition internationally has been a major rationale for institution of
the Single Market project , and subsequently mutual recognition agreements
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(MRAs) have been agreed between the EU and several other countries, as
well as within the Asia Pacic Economic Community (see Maskus andWilson
(1), 2001). A similar awareness underlies the articles on Technical Barriers to
Trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) in the WTO Agree-
ment from the Uruguay Round, and the General Agreement on Trade in
Services. For example the WTO Agreement Annex on Technical Barriers to
Trade Article 2 states that:
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not pre-
pared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the e¤ect of
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this
purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive
than necessary to full a legitimate objective,taking account of
the risks non-fullment would create.
Notwithstanding these agreements, there has been considerable concern
voiced at the recent Cancun summit (eg by the International Centre for Trade
and Sustainable Development1, or the UNICE)that the TBT and SPS agree-
ments do not go far enough, particularly from the viewpoint of developing
countries. Against that, there is of course considerable resistance by many
countries to seeing their policies on safety, environmental emissions, labour
standards etc subject to trade treaties.
The major problem with economic assessment of TBTs is that they are
potentially much more complicated to analyse than tari¤s or quotas. As
the WTO Agreement itself recognises, there are legitimate reasonsfor such
1
Most governments have realised that trade restrictions of this nature may
be necessary and appropriate to ensure food security as well as animal and
health protection. However, the increasing and arbitrary use of such mea-
sures by developed countries, often to protect domestic industry, has caused
great concern among developing countries. Further, rms from developing
and less-developed countries often face considerable di¢ culty in conform-
ing to the high standards and technical regulations set by the industrialised
countries.
- From the notes to the ICTSD special session at the Cancun summit.
http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/tds/Session-1-3.htm
4
barriers, and deciding to what extent barriers observed are in practice legiti-
mate or constitute an obstacle to trade2 is not a simple task. First the issue
of denition. Fischer and Serra (2000) dene a standard in a cross-hauling
duopoly model as non-protectionist when it corresponds to the standard the
local social planner would use if both rms were domestic. This goes beyond
the denitions of obstacles to tradein the WTO Agreements, and if applied
it would mean a maximalist role for the WTO (and the General Agreement
on Trade in Services), which would impinge severely upon what are usually
seen as legitimate areas for national public choice.
Consequently, for this paper I prefer a narrower denition of protection: a
regulation is non-protectionist if it 1) does not reduce traded volumes and 2)
does not favour the prots of local against foreign producers. This denition
leaves a category of trade-related strategic distortions, notably the case
where regulation causes local consumers to benet from increased sales (at
lower cost and reduced prot) by both domestic and foreign producers. In
this case, there are much stronger parallels between international standards
coordination and the issue of international tax competition, rather than with
tari¤s or quota policies. It may well be that such distortions, where they do
not directly discriminate against importers, are best dealt with by national
governments in fora other than the WTO, GATT or GATS.
Turning to specic cases, and asking whether regulations are legitimate
or constitute regulatory protection, a few conclusions can be drawn from the
literature to date. Where regulations clearly apply to conditions of produc-
tion abroad which di¤er from those at home (e.g. bans on goods produced
under bad labour or environmental conditions) there may indeed be a serious
case for saying that an import ban is also serving a protectionist purpose.
However, many of the regulations imposed by governments apply both to
production at home and to imports (though, if there are xed costs involved,
compliance with many di¤erent countriesvarying standards is of course po-
tentially an expense for companies which trade in many countries against
those trading in just one). Moreover, there may be ostensibly valid economic
reasons for their institution. Indeed, while a government would have some
scope for introducing pure cost-increasing regulations as a strategic trade
policy (see Wallner, 1998 ), it seems unlikely substantial use would be made
of a policy which imposes high resource cost on consumers unless other means
2Or regulatory protection(see e.g. Baldwin, 2001), the terminology henceforth used
in this paper.
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(eg tari¤s) which impose a much smaller deadweight loss are ruled out, e.g.
by trade agreements, or unless that policy were initially instituted for other
reasons, and the changes for trade reasons were at the margin.
Strictly speaking, regulationsare applied by governments, while stan-
dardstend to be voluntarily agreed by industries (Sykes, 1995). This paper
ignores the di¤erence. In general, a voluntary industry standard is more
likely to be operated to maximise prots of domestic rms than a govern-
ment regulation. However, under the former, importers may be able to enter
the market without complying. This paper concentrates on the simpler case
of government regulation, which is assumed to aim at maximising net utility
in the home country.
Regulatory di¤erences between countries can in principle be broadly
dened as either horizontalor vertical. The former impose di¤erent tech-
nologies or di¤erent, and often incompatible means of achieving a given set
of results: such as insisting on certain plug sizes for appliances. By contrast,
verticalstandards are where a regulator clearly insists that goods achieve
at least a certain minimum standard of, say, safety or performance. In prac-
tice many regulations may have both horizontal and vertical aspects, such
as insisting that cars achieve less than certain emissions levels, and insisting
they achieve this by use of catalytic converter technology (or choosing a set
of emissions standards which can only be achieved by catalytic converters,
while perhaps ignoring other pollutants which converters do not touch).
The most widely-recognised reason why horizontal regulation may be
called for is network externalities (see, eg Gandal, 2001). This is the situa-
tion where the goods used by large numbers of people need to be compatible
with one another (e.g. television sets working on a PAL or NTSC system).
Neither system may be inherently superior, but there is a substantial poten-
tial e¢ ciency gain if all consumers in one country use a compatible technol-
ogy. There may be a good economic reason for the government to impose
one technology, rather than letting di¤erent technologies ght a costly battle
for supremacy. However, the scope for distorting such a system for protec-
tionist purposes is also clear: if technologies are not easily compatible, the
government can favour home rather than foreign producers.
In the case of vertical quality, the literature to date recognises three main
reasons why the government may wish to impose minimum quality controls.
Possession of unreliable or dangerous goods may impose externalities upon
other people (e.g. a dangerous car endangers other road users ): whether or
not other means of ensuring these are dealt with (e.g. compulsory insurance)
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are adequate is perhaps a side issue - in practice the state usually does insist
on goods meeting certain standards. The most extreme case of externali-
ties justifying quality standards (including trade barriers) is disease control,
which is the main justication for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards
(SPS).
A second reason is informational di¤erences: purchasers of goods may
not easily be able to distinguish the quality. In this case (see e.g. Akerlof,
1970, Leland, 1979) adverse selection may mean that bad goods drive out
the good ones, unless there is either an e¤ective central labelling scheme or
some minimum quality standard.
The third motivation is where consumers have diverse tastes in terms
of quality, and where supply is oligopolistic. In this case (see eg Shaked
and Sutton, (1982), Das and Donnenfeld (1989), Lutz (1996(1) and (2)),
rms may reduce price competition between themselves by choosing to make
their goods excessively diverse, and minimum quality standards which force
the lower-quality rms to raise standards can increase competition between
rms. In general, in this model, a minimum quality standard will increase
competition in the medium- and higher-quality ends of the market, though
low quality (poorer) consumers will su¤er, and may reduce purchases. Lower-
quality producers in particular will su¤er lost prots, and if these are foreign
companies, there will be a temptation on the regulator to set excessively high
minimum standards. In this model (see Lutz, 1996(1)) mutual recognition
benets both countries, particularly the lower-quality producer.
However, the above papers, which focus on newer theories of diverse
quality under oligopoly, have been set up in a market with a xed number
of consumers buying at most one good each. This means they tend to ignore
a key feature of the classical monopoly or oligopoly model: namely that
producers can raise prices by restricting output. Where quality di¤erences
substitute with diminishing returns for quantity of consumption, there may
be a scope for producers to increase prots at consumersexpense, not just
by restricting output volumes, but also by reducing quality. This provides a
fourth possible justication for minimum quality standards: to correct the
underprovision of quality by monopolistic or oligopolistic rms.
1.2 Outline of This Paper
This paper concentrates on the fourth justication for vertical regulations:
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as a response to the underprovision of quality by a classical monopoly. Sec-
tion 2) examines the issue of pure vertical standards: the approach is rst
to develop a model for a simple monopoly and then to extend it to a cross-
hauling duopoly with one identical rm in each of two identical countries,
where consumers have identical preferences and the good concerned is a sub-
stitute for other consumer goods.
In these circumstances, a vertical minimum quality standard is poten-
tially welfare-improving. However, countries will tend to set standards higher
than is optimal, and cross-country harmonisation benets welfare. A mutual
recognition regime tends to result in the opposite tendency: for standards
to be set below the global optimum - this is a point not picked up in the
previous literature based on the Shaked/Sutton model.
Section 3) considers the issue of more clearly protectionist pure horizon-
tal quality standards, imposing a resource cost on foreign producers only. In
line with Wallner and Baldwin, it is shown that such protectionist standards
may be imposed from a prot-shifting motive (though only when other forms
of protection, such as tari¤s, are ruled out). However, when the model in-
corporates vertical protection, this reduces prots substantially: hence the
prot-shifting motive is greatly reduced. Where countries di¤er in quality of
production, there may in some circumstances be a prot-shifting motive for
the higher-quality country to raise minimum vertical standards, but again
the circumstances and scope for this are more limited than the previous lit-
erature has suggested.
Finally, in section 4) I review briey the Shaked/Sutton-style diverse
consumers model. I suggest that the diverse consumers and classical oligopoly
model are not mutually exclusive, and that, if variable consumption levels
are allowed (unlike in the literature mentioned above), many of the results
of the classical monopoly model investigated in this paper still carry across
to a hybrid model.
2 A Theoretical Model of Vertical Quality
Regulation
Unlike much of the literature to date, in this paper I am interested in ver-
tical quality regulations: ie regulations which improve the minimum quality
experienced by consumers. I show that, in the absence of regulations, on rea-
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sonable assumptions imperfect competition reduces the quality of goods on
o¤er to consumers, but that in the presence of trade there may be strategic
distortions a¤ecting the decisions of single country regulators if they do not
collaborate.
I start by looking at the simplest case: where goods are produced by a
monopolist. This is because many of the features of the monopoly model
carry over to oligopoly. It is assumed that consumers are identical in tastes
and incomes, and initially a single country case is considered. The paper
uses a partial equilibrium approach, concentrating on just one good.
Firms produce output with two features, quality, Q, and quantity, Y . I
assume that the total cost of production, C, is a linear function of Q and Y ,
with  and b denoting the linear scalars
C = aY + bQ: (1)
We assume that demand for quality and output is homothetic, so that we
can convert quality and output to a measure of quality-adjusted output, X.
For simplicity we assume X is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of Y and Q
X = Y Q1  (2)
where  is a nonlinear scalar which lies between zero and unity.
We can also convert the price per unit of output P into a price per unit
of quality adjusted output, PX .
Consumer utility depends upon consumption both of quality-adjusted
output, X, of a residual aggregate of other goods, Z = M  PXX (where M
is an exogenously given endoment) in a quasilinear fashion thus eliminat-
ing income e¤ects. For simplicity, total income, M , is assumed constant
implying Z = M   PXX and the marginal valuation for the good in ques-
tion is assumed to have a constant demand elasticity implying a constant
elasticity of demand
U = M   PXX + X: (3)
2.1 Monopoly Equilibrium under Quality Regulation
We shall begin our analysis by focusing on the case of a quality regulated
monopolist. The monopolists prot mark-up will be a decreasing function
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of demand elasticity . For a nite mark-up we need to assume  lies between
zero and unity.
We start by considering the behaviour of an unregulated monopoly. We
denote the behaviour of the unregulated monopoly with a subscript u. For a
given level of X = Xu, we can obtain the cost-minimising value of Q(= Qu)3.
This yields a constant marginal cost
MCu = (a=)((a=1)((1  )=)) 1 : (5)
Now introduce a minimum quality regulation which xesQ  QR:In prac-
tice, if QR > Qu then the rm will choose Q = QR. It is also assumed that
the regulator only sets a minimum quality standard: there is no regulation
of volume supplied or price (this may be a more realistic assumption for the
oligopoly case considered later rather than in a natural monopoly case).
By contrast with the unregulated case, marginal cost is now a function
of Q and X:
MCR = (a=)(R=u)
(1 )= (6)
where  denotes the output/quality ratio X=Q. This implies that asQ
is increased by regulation, the marginal cost of quality-adjusted output X
will fall (unless X rises as fast asQ, which will not happen with a downward-
sloping demand curve). This leads to our rst result.
Proposition 1 If a monopolist is constrained by regulation to produce to
a higher standard than he would otherwise choose, the marginal cost of in-
creasing quality-adjusted output is less than when the choice of quality is
unconstrained.
This can be shown in gure 1, which deals with the rms unconstrained
and constrained choice of crude output. Given free choice of quality and
quantity the rm will choose (Qu; Yu) on the ray Qu=Yu = k. However, the
rm is not now free to choose Q < QR: it follows that for quantities of
quality-adjusted output up to XF the rm is forced to incur higher cost C
for a given level of quality-adjusted level of output X than it would freely
choose. However, as output increases the total cost line approaches the ray
Qu=Yu = k. This suggests that imposing a quality standard of QR > Qu
means the marginal cost of increasing X is less than it would be if the rm
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freely chose Q and Y , up to the point whereX = XF . The reason total cost
is higher is because the minimum standard e¤ectively imposes a xed cost
CF (QR) on the rm.
Since we are assuming a constant demand elasticity 1=( 1) for the rms
produce, the monopolist will set a xed proportional markup over marginal
cost. It follows that the introduction of QR > Qu will lead to lower prices
(at least per unit of quality-adjusted output), and hence to higher consumer
sales, at least as long as the standard is not set so high that the monopolist
chooses to exit the market. This leads to our next result:
Proposition 2 A quality constrained monopolist sell more quality-adjusted
output at a lower quality-adjusted price than an unregulated monopolist, and
this output rises monotonically with the quality standard as long as the rm
continues to produce.




This conrms that for positive ; and  and 1 >  > 0 , XR is increasing
monotonically with respect to QR.
This is illustrated in gure 2. For X < XF the new marginal cost curve,
MCR(X), lies below the old one,MCU(X). Consequently the monopolist will
now increase quality-adjusted output to equal XR rather than Xu as before.
It can also be seen fairly easily from the diagram that consumer surplus is
increased. By di¤erentiating (3) we can see that since 0< < 1;consumer
surplus increases monotonically with X, and since Proposition 2 shows X
increases monotonically with QR we derive:
Proposition 3 Consumer surplus rises monotonically with the minimum
quality.
The next question is what standard a regulator will set, given that it
is assumed to be able to regulate the minimum quality standard, but not
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prices or output? If the monopolist is foreign, an interesting result follows
from Proposition 3:
Proposition 4 If the monopolist is foreign, a regulator maximising domestic
welfare will set the highest quality standard at which the rm does not exit
the market.
Normally we would assume this to be the rms reservation level of QR
corresponding to R = 04.
If the monopolist is domestic, the situation is rather di¤erent. Using the
superscript D to denote this case,WD = UD+D . We have set up the model
such that changes in regulatory quality, QR, only a¤ect UD via changes in
quality-adjusted output, XD: Hence we can write
dWD=dQR   dD=dQR = (dUD=dXD)(dXD=dQR): (9)
We know that these two right hand terms are positive - hence the marginal
gain in social welfare from raising QR is always greater than the marginal
gain in private prot to the rm. We also know that D decreases with
QR. From the discussion above, we can conclude that at the unregulated
monopoly quality, Q0, the marginal social gain to raising QR above this level
will be positive.
By double di¤erentiating equation (7) with respect to QR we know that
the rate of increase in output with respect to the regulation quality will
decelerate. Likewise by di¤erentiating (3), the increase in consumer utility
with respect to output also decelerates when 0 <  < 1. It follows that the
di¤erence between marginal social and private net gains from raisingQR will
decline as QR rises. It is therefore probable that at some point the marginal
loss in prots from raisingQR will exceed the marginal gain to consumers, un-
less prots have already fallen to below their reservation level at this point.
There will therefore be a social optimum for setting QR, when the mo-
nopolist is domestic, and this level QDR >Qu the unregulated monopoly level.
4This can be shown to equal:
QFR = ((a=b)((1  )=))(1 )=(1 )(=a)1=(1 ): (8)
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If at this level QDR , the prots of the rm are still greater than their reser-
vation level, then the regulator will not impose as high standards as if the
rm were foreign. This is an important point, since it implies that often,
once we allow that some consumption is foreign-produced, there may be an
incentive on the regulator to raise quality standards beyond what is glob-
ally optimal, imposing extra costs on the foreign producer(s), but beneting
local consumers. Whether QDR > Q
F
R is an empirical matter depending on
parameter values.
This can be summed up:
Proposition 5 The quality standard chosen by a domestic welfare max-
imising regulator when the regulator is foreign exceeds the socially optimal
standard chosen when the monopolist is domestic, unless parameter values
are such that the socially optimal standard produces zero prots.
Propositions 1-5 have shown that, when there is a single unregulated mo-
nopolist, there is a tendency to undersupply both quality and crude quantity,
but that when quality regulation is introduced there can be a bias in regula-
tion where the monopolist is foreign: namely that a regulator will choose to
impose excessively high quality standards on a foreign monopolist. Much of
this analysis carries across to the case of oligopoly.
2.2 Quality Regulation in a Cross-Hauling Cournot
Duopoly
We now assume that, instead of a single monopolist, there are two identical
rms in the industry: f = f1and f2, set in countries c = c1 and c2 respec-
tively. All consumers in both countries have identical tastes, and the two
rms produce products which are perfect substitutes, with identical produc-
tion functions.
As before, we assume consumersutility in country 1 depends on total
consumption, which we now denote Z1,
where Z1 = X11 +X21, the aggregate of the quality-adjusted sales of the
two rms to country 1.
Utility is given by
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U1 = U + Z

1   PX1Z1 (10)
where PX1is the price of the quality-adjusted output in country 1
(which is the same for both suppliers, since they both produce goods which
are perfect substitutes).
Again, X11 and X21 are Cobb-Douglas aggregates of quality Q and crude
quantity Y , and cost Cfc is a linear function of Y fc and Qfc.
We are crucially assuming that rm f chooses its quality to supply to
each market separately, and that quality chosen to supply to country 1 has
no e¤ect on the costs of quality in country 2.
Since the cost side of the model is unchanged from that of the monopoly
above, we can proceed by analogy with the earlier analysis. When a rm
is unregulated the marginal cost of increasing quality-adjusted output X is
constant, as given by (5) above. Likewise, when country c1 sets a higher
quality standard than the unregulated duopoly would choose, marginal costs
fall as (Qf;c1=Xf;c1) rises, as indicated by equation (7).
The demand side is somewhat more complicated. For maximum utility,
consumers will consume up to the point where marginal utility from con-
sumption equals quality-adjusted price:
For maximum prot, rm f will set marginal revenue in market 1 equal
to marginal cost. This involves some sort of assumption about the behaviour
of the rival rm: we assume each rm f assumes its rival will keep quality-
adjusted output X constant in response to changes in fs output5. It can
be shown that marginal revenue for a given level of output is greater in the
duopoly case than for a monopoly 67, and that therefore combined output is
set at a level somewhat greater than in a monopoly, both for a regulated and
for an unregulated and unregulated duopoly:
Zu1 = ((1=2)(1 + (1=))
1=1 Xu1; (11)
5 ie we are assuming a Cournot-Nash duopoly
6Setting marginal revenue for each rm equal to price,
MR1f = (X11 +X21)
 2((   1)X1f + x11 +X12)




ZR1 = ((1=2)(1 + (1=))
=1 XR1: (12)
This implies that the combined duopoly sales, ZR1, for a given level
of QR1, exceed monopoly sales by a constant proportion. Also, combined
duopoly sales are a rising function ofQR1. This means that, as with the
monopolist, consumer utility UR1 will rise monotonically with QR1. We can
therefore produce the rst propositions to the cournot duopoly case by anal-
ogy with the monopoly case:
Proposition 6 If a cournot duopoly of identical rms is constrained by reg-
ulation to produce to a higher standard than they would otherwise choose,
the marginal cost of increasing quality-adjusted output is less than when the
choice of quality is unconstrained.
Proposition 7 A cournot duopoly of identical rms will sell more quality-
adjusted output at a lower quality-adjusted price than an unregulated duopoly,
and this output rises monotonically with the quality standard as long as the
rms continue to supply the market.
Proposition 8 Consumer surplus with a quality regulated cournot duopoly
rises monotonically with the minimum quality standard.
For optimal choice of regulation standards, the analysis can proceed
along similar lines to where there is a monopoly. Total welfare in country 1
is
W1 = U1 + 11 + 12; (13)
where 11 is the prot made by rm 1 in country 1, and 12 is the prot
rm 1 makes in country 2 and remits to country 1.
The implication here is that, for each regulator, one of the two supplying
rms is foreign. While raising the quality standard benets consumers at the
expense of the rmsprots, only the one rms prots (ie half total prots)
will be taken into account by the regulator. Hence quality standards will be
set too high, if the regulators do not cooperate..
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More formally, welfare in country 1 is assumed to depend only on con-
sumer surplus and rm 1s domestic prots:
dWR1=dQR1 = (dUR1=dZR1)(dZR1=dQR1) + dR11=QR1 > dR11=QR1
(14)
It follows by analogy with the signs of rst and second di¤erentials we
established in the monopoly case that, that if rms are forced to produce
above their unregulated choice of quality, prots will fall increasingly in re-
lation to QR1 . This should lead to a non-cooperative welfare-maximising
choice of standard for the regulator (which is either the point at which the
marginal cost to rm 1 alone equals the marginal loss of consumer surplus,
or else the point at which rms exit the market).
Compare this non-cooperative solution to a globally optimal solution. In
this case, global welfare, GW is the sum of W1 and W 2. Di¤erentiating this
with respect to QR1:
dGWR1=dQR1 = (dUR1=dZR1)(dZR1=dQR1) + 2dR11=QR1 (15)
assuming (by symmetry) that dR21=dQR1 = dR11=dQR1:
Once more it will be worth increasing QR1 beyond Qu11, the quality
which maximises private prots. However, beyond this point, this time the
regulator takes into account the decline in both rmsprots as he increases
QR1: consequently total global welfare peaks with respect to QR1 rather
faster than country 1s welfare, and the regulator will set a more modest
standard in this case, unless again the global welfare-maximising standard is
still high enough to cause rms to exit.
Proposition 9 The quality standards chosen in an identical cross-hauling
cournot duopoly when the two regulators do not cooperate exceed the socially
optimal standard which would be chosen by a global regulator, unless parame-
ter values are such that the socially optimal standard produces zero prots.
This overregulation benets consumers at the expense of both rms.
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The point at which the rms exit the market can be deduced by analogy
to equation (8): again the issue of whether or not this sets a practical ceiling
to the level at which the regulators set standards is an empirical matter
depending on parameter values.
We now look at the case where the two countries make a mutual recog-
nition agreement, under which each country will set its own independent
quality standard for production, but will accept any goods produced by the
other countrys producer which are acceptable to its own regulator. With
mutual recognition, we assume the regulator in country 1 assumes rm 1
will sell goods at quality QR1 in both markets, but at the same time, rm
2s product standards will not change in either market. This means that
the regulator is assumed to calculate that only rm 1 will raise its sales in
country 1 in response to risingQR1. Consequently, the marginal increase in
combined sales in country 1, ZR1;is only half as big as in the case where there
is no mutual recognition.
However, changes in welfare will include the change in prots of company
1s exports to country 2. Again we can say (by symmetry of the two countries
and companies):
dR12=dQR1 = dR11=dQR1
Consequently, the marginal welfare e¤ect to country 1 of changing QR1
is:
dWMR1 =dQR1 = dGW=dQR1   (1=2)(dUMR1 =dZMR1 )(dZMR1 =dQR1) (16)
By contrast, the increase in global welfare from raisingQR1 in this case
will include the gains to consumer utility in country 2 from higher qual-









2 =dQR1 = dZ
MR
2 =dQR1; it follows that
the marginal welfare gain to country 1 from raising product standards is less
than the global welfare gain, and that as a result standards under mutual
recognition will be set lower than optimal.
Proposition 10 The quality standards chosen by the country regulators
in an identical cross-hauling cournot duopoly will be lower when there is a
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mutual recognition than the socially optimal standard which would be chosen
by a global regulator.
As a nal point on these models of pure horizontal regulation it is worth
noting the following, which follows from Propositions 6-10:
Proposition 11 Non-cooperative setting of pure vertical standards in a
cross-hauling cournot duopoly with identical consumers and rms does not
alter the market shares of domestic versus foreign rms, and increases rather
than decreasing trade volumes compared to the global optimum. Consequently
on the denition in the introduction it should be considered strategic over-
regulation rather than regulatory protectionism. Mutual recognition leads to
strategic underregulation.
The broad conclusion of the above propositions is that, when rms are
identical but possess monopoly power and are spread across various coun-
tries, if regulators do not cooperate they will choose excessive vertical quality
standards. Contrary to the received wisdom these are trade-increasing. How-
ever, if the regulators choose to cooperate by means of introducing a mutual
recognition agreement, they will then be tempted to undercut each others
standards, leading to a decline in both quality and trade to below the opti-
mum.
3 A model of vertical and horizontal quality
regulation
The discussion above has concentrated on vertical quality regulations: ie ones
which quantitatively raise some measure of quality experienced by consumers
for all goods within an industry. By contrast, much of the literature on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) focuses on horizontal regulations, which
discriminate between suppliers in one country against another, or between
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those using one technique rather than another, and which do not directly
a¤ect consumer utility.
The reason why a country should impose horizontal TBTs is not im-
mediately apparent. After all, a horizontal TBT against imports involves
imposing a resource cost on imports. Any changes in import share could
equally be achieved by an equivalent tari¤, which would by contrast raise
revenue for the importing countrys government. It follows that pure hori-
zontal TBTs are only likely to appeal to a government where tari¤s are ruled
out (eg by trade agreements), or where TBTs are regarded as less visible,
and hence less likely to provoke retaliation.
Again, it is worth bearing in mind that in a perfectly competitive model,
with constant returns to scale, horizontal TBTs just lower national welfare,
since they impose a resource cost which worsens both the importing and the
exporting countriesterms of trade.
Horizontal TBTs may, however, be of appeal to regulators in four cir-
cumstances, where the alternative of tari¤s is ruled out:
1) Where there is monopolistic prot in an industry, there may be a
prot-shifting motive. In this case, any policy measure which raises domestic
suppliersmarket share will also tend to raise their prots, and in the absence
of cooperation it may be worth a country using such measures at the margin
even when they involve imposing a real resource cost on consumers.
2) There may be agglomeration economies in the industry, which mean
that a country which raises its domestic output by imposing TBTs can either
lower local production costs (which may benet consumers in a model with
transport costs) or raise local factor rents.
3) There may be agency capture so that the regulator is acting on behalf
of local producers rather than the importing country as a whole .
4) Horizontal legislation may to some extent be inevitable where there
are network externalities (see the discussion in the introduction).
In this paper we consider the rst of these motives only.
3.1 Pure Horizontal Technical Barriers to Trade
Consider rst the motives for introducing a pure horizontal TBT in the non-
cooperative Cournot duopoly model where there is no vertical regulation. I
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assume the horizontal TBT adds a cost of T per quality-adjusted unit of the
good under consideration imported into country 1, while having no e¤ect
on the vertical quality experienced by consumers. By contrast, it does not
a¤ect the costs to domestic suppliers. It is assumed that the two countries
have agreed not to impose tari¤s or quotas on trade between them, so that
a horizontal TBT is the only form of protection available for the domestic
rm.
From equation (5), where there is no vertical regulation, marginal costs
of producingX are constant atMCU . However, since we have introduced the
horizontal TBT, marginal costs for rm 2 selling to country 1 are now
MCh21=MCu + T (17)
where the subscript h denotes the case with horizontal barriers.
If we assume rm fs market share is hf1, we can show that the rms
marginal revenue declines with its market share8. We can also show that the
quality-adjusted price facing consumers in country 1 rises with the market
share for the domestic producer rm 19. It follows that, for the e¤ects of the
introduction of a pure horizontal TBT on imports from rm 2 to country 1
of T per quality-adjusted unit output X; marginal costs for rm 2 supplying
to country 1 will be raised, and consequently, rm 2 will reduce its market
share (which raises its marginal revenue, according to equation (21)). Cor-
respondingly rm 1s market share will rise, so its marginal revenue will fall
somewhat. But, since marginal costs are constant, rm 1 cannot allow its
marginal revenue to fall, so it too will restrain production. The resulting
equilibrium will give lower total sales (and hence a higher Px) but a higher
market share to rm 1 than initially (while rm 2 has a higher marginal rev-
enue than initially, reecting its cutback in sales, and equating to its raised
marginal cost).
8To be precise, for each supplier
MRhf1 = :Z
 1
f1 (1  (1  ):hf1) (18)





For the welfare implications of this pure horizontal TBT, consider total
welfare in country 1, which consists of consumer surplus plus rm 1s prots
at home and abroad. We assume 12, the prots made by the domestic
rm on its exports, is una¤ected by any TBTs introduced by country 1.
Consequently, this term disappears when we di¤erentiate W1 with respect to
T1.
dWh1=dTh1 = 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 (19)
1 = (MUh1   Pxh1)dZh1=dTh1 (20)
2 = +h11(Pxh1  MCu)dZh1=dT h1 (21)
3 =  (1  h11)Zh1dPxh1=dT h1 (22)
4 = +Zh1(Pxh1  MCu)dh11=dTh1 (23)
1 is the di¤erence between consumer price and social costs times the
change in consumption. Since we are assuming there are no indirect taxes,
and since consumers are assumed to be utility-maximising, this will equal
zero. 2 is the home rms share in the total change in output times its
prot margin (this will be zero or negative as Zh1 falls with T h1). 3 is the
cost of the increased price to consumers of the initial volume of imports from
rm 2. This also yields negative welfare, since the price of imports rises. 4
represents the prot shift, since h11 , the home rms share, will rise with
Th1, and this will yield extra prots, if the prot markup h11 is positive.
This prot-shifting gain is the only potential welfare gain from introducing
the horizontal TBT in our model, and yet it clearly only applies when there is
a positive prot markup - indeed a large enough prot markup to outweigh
the other two terms (and since the rst term, which reduces welfare, also
increases with h11 the chances on the TBT raising welfare are still further
reduced).
Proposition 12 In the case where basic production costs of the two rms
are the same, if the regulator maximises domestic welfare, a pure horizontal
barrier will only be introduced where initial (pre-barrier) prots are positive
and the prot shift is large enough to outweigh the loss of consumer surplus
and the e¤ect on domestic prots of a shrinking total home market.
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Since the introduction of vertical quality standards in the absence of
cooperation or mutual recognition has already been shown (Proposition 9)
to either reduce or totally eliminate prots, Proposition 13 can be deduced:
Proposition 13 In the case where basic production costs of the two rms
are the same, if the regulator also introduces vertical standards to maximise
domestic welfare, the incentive on the regulator to introduce horizontal TBTs
is either reduced or completely eliminated.
Even purevertical standards may of course have a protectionist el-
ement if production costs di¤er. In this case, the country with the lower
marginal costs of raising quality may have incentives to raise its vertical
quality standards above the socially optimal level for what we are dening
as protectionist, rather than simply strategic reasons: higher minimum stan-
dards may raise the market share of the domestic producer at the importers
expense.
To see how this can happen, consider the case where the two rms
have the same marginal costs of producing quality-adjusted output X when
unregulated (ie MCu1 =MCu2). Let us dene b2= b1, in which case rais-
ing quality is more expensive for rm 2 than rm 1 if  > 1.If unregulated
marginal costs are the same, it is easy to show that a2 =  
 1:a1:
In this case, in the absence of regulation, the less quality-suited rm 2
will set a lower quality than rm 1:
Qd1=Qd2 =  
 (24)
To analyse what happens in this case, rst, consider a situation where
the globally optimal regulatory standard QR1 in country 1 lies between Qd2
and Qd1. In this situation, raising QR1 at the margin will raise the costs of
the importing rm F2, lowering its market share and prots, but not a¤ect
the costs of F1. As in this situation demand will shift towards F1, this
rms prots will actually improve as QR1 is raised (up to the point where
QR= Qd1). In the absence of international cooperation, the regulator will
only take account of the (rising) consumer welfare and F1s (rising) prots,
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and hence will keep raising QR at least to Qd1, even if this is above the
globally optimal level. In this case, QR1> QR

1 and we clearly have not just
strategic distortion but (on our narrow denition) protectionism as well, since
the higher standard reduces trade and benets local prots at the expense
of foreigners.
What about the case, though, where QR1 > Qd1 ? It is fairly easy to
show that, once QR1 is raised above Qd1, market shares of the two rms
cease to change any more. The ratio of marginal costs of the rms will be
constant betond this point10, and since prices depend only on nmarginal costs
and prot markup, the shares of the two rms and , once QR rises above
Qd1, further rises in QR will not a¤ect rmsmarket shares, with marginal
costs and prices rising at proportionally the same rate for both rms, so there
is no prot-shifting motive. Hence our last Proposition:
Proposition 14 Where rmsmarginal costs of raising quality di¤er, there
may be a prot-shifting motive for the regulator to raise vertical standards
above the global optimum in the country where the marginal cost of raising
quality is lower, but this motive only exists if the global quality optimum lies
below what the domestic rm in that country would choose if unregulated.
Otherwise, the regulator will only raise minimum standards to the point where
the foreign rm is forced to supply at the same quality as the domestic rm
freely chooses.
It follows from the above discussion that, while a prot-shifting motive
for introducing cost-increasing pure horizontal TBTs is conceivable, the cir-
cumstances in which this is likely to occur, and the degree to which it is
likely to apply are greatly reduced compared to the implications of previous
studies (eg Baldwin, Wallner).
10The ratio of marginal costs is given by:
MC1=MC2 = (a1=a2)(11=(1  11)(1 )=): (25)
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4 Models with heterogeneous consumers
One further question is the e¤ects of introducing heterogeneous consumers,
in the sense of di¤erent quality preferences. As explained in the introduc-
tion, several papers (Das/Donnenfeld, Lutz (1) and (2)) have applied a
Shaked/Sutton duopoly model to the issue of minimum quality standards
and trade. This model does not allow consumers to vary consumption (other
than choosing not to buy the good concerned) and so is very limited in terms
of price (or quality-adjusted price) elasticities, consequently failing to pick
up many of the classical monopoly e¤ects outlined in this paper.
Nevertheless there are some interesting results, shown on gures 3a-b
(appendix). Quality preferences are assumed to be distributed uniformly
across the range QL to QH .
Without regulation (the top row of the diagram), the rms space them-
selves out producing Q1 and Q2. It is assumed the home rm (F1) has the
higher quality. This spacing is partly to reduce the price elasticities the rms
face, and so will happen even if they face identical costs. Consumers to the
right of Q0 will all choose to consume the good, and the split of demand
between the two rms is shown.
When a minimum quality oor QM (assumed to be greater than Q2) is
introduced, rm 2 is forced to increase its quality. Firm 1 will also slightly
increase its quality in order to keep some product di¤erentiation. Never-
theless, the di¤erentiation of the two rmsproducts is reduced, leading to
increased price competition. This benets consumers, though there is a loss
of utility to the lowest-quality consumers, some of whom (left of QQ0) cease
to purchase the good at all - so overall sales go down. Trade volumes will
probably decrease, particularly if rm 2s costs are greatly increased by being
forced to raise quality. However, unless the cost di¤erences between the two
rms are very great, 2s market share will rise, not fall. Firm 1s prots will
be reduced by raising the minimum quality standard.
In these circumstances, there is likely to be an incentive on the regulator
in country 1 to raise the minimum quality threshold excessively high, since
it ignores the loss of prots to rm 2. Lutz (1996, (1)) shows that in these
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circumstances a mutual recognition agreement between the two countries
(which tends to reduce quality standards) is welfare-improving.
In principle it would be possible to combine the diverse consumers model
with the classical monopoly model outlined in sections 2-4 of this paper,
though this would be a somewhat complicated exercise. It is likely in such a
hybrid model that the classical monopoly e¤ect means that a mutual recogni-
tion would lead to suboptimal standards, though numerical anaalysis would
be needed to ascertain how important this e¤ect.
5 Conclusion
The WTO Agreements recognise the need to avoid regulatory protection
when setting national technical standards and regulations, but also acknowl-
edge that such standards are often introduced for legitimate reasons. This
leaves a considerable area of ambiguity for policymakers, which has not cur-
rently been lled satisfactorily by the economic literature. This literature
to date has tende to be dominated by case studies, anecdotes and empirical
studies which have tended to assume that a particular form of regulatory
protection - pure cost-increasing standards aimed to protect domestic rms
against foreign rms - is dominant. At the other end of the literature is a rel-
atively small amount of theoretical work, mainly based on the Shaked/Sutton
di¤erentiated consumers model of an oligopoly, which indicates that strategic
distortions in regulatory policy will be likely in the presence of trade, and
suggests that mutual recognition will be welfare-increasing.
In contrast to previous studies, this paper looks at the more classical types
of monopolistic distortion (which may not necessarily be incompatible with
the di¤erentiated consumers model). In this model, unregulated monopoly
power leads to suboptimal quality as well as quantity of goods produced. It is
shown that regulation increases both quantity and quality of goods available,
and therefore that there is a valid economic reason for quality regulation of
a form which actually increases trade.
It is further shown that where some suppliers are foreign, there is an
incentive for the domestic regulator to demand an excessive minimum stan-
dard, reducing prots (home as well as foreign) but beneting consumers.
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This strategic distortion, however, does not conform to traditional ideas of
protectionism, as it leads to excessive, rather than suboptimal trade volumes,
and does not necessarily involve bias against foreign rather than domestic
producers.
While mutual recognition does remove the strategic distortion in favour
of excess standard setting (and so, paradoxically, can actually reduce trade
volumes), unlike previous approaches this study shows that it is not neces-
sarily welfare-increasing, since under mutual recognition there is an incentive
to regulators to allow lower than optimal domestic standards, to boost ex-
portersprots at the expense of foreign consumers.
The paper also shows that there may be some incentive to impose
pure cost-increasing standards on foreign rms, as others (eg Wallner or
Baldwin) have indicated, but this is only the case where tari¤s are ruled
out. Also, the gains to a country from this kind of prot-shifting horizontal
barrier are greatly reduced when the tendency to produce higher vertical
regulatory standards is also taken account. In many circumstances, there
may be little, if any foreign prot for a protected domestic rm to capture.
Even mixed horizontal/vertical barriers may only prove attractive in limited
circumstances.
A brief assessment of the alternative Shaked/Sutton model of compe-
tition under oligopoly (with diverse consumers but inelastic total demand)
shows a number of similar conclusions to the classical oligopoly model in
this paper. Regulation reduces prices and prots (by forcing producers to
produce more similar goods), and raises welfare (though, unlike the classical
oligopoly it does not raise sales). Again, there is an incentive to overdo this
regulation (reducing foreignersprots), even though this strategic distortion
may well increase, rather than reducing trade. Unlike the classical monopoly
model (to which it may be complementary to some extent) mutual recog-
nition is always welfare-improving: however, in a more complicated model
which incorporated elastic overall demand, this result might well not hold.
As for assessing current regulations: actually disentangling how much of
these regulations really consists of TBTs or regulatory protectionmay not
be an easy task. This paper casts a somewhat sceptical light on the tendency
to assume that many technical regulations are trade-impeding and should be
tackled under the auspices of the WTO or other trade bodies. Assessment
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of the welfare e¤ects of harmonisation or mutual recognition should not be
carried out on the assumption that regulations are purely cost-increasing,
since the above analysis indicates that if regulators are seeking to maximise
national welfare it is unlikely they will introduce large barriers of this kind,
and indeed national variations in standards may genuinely reect di¤erences
in national preferences with regard to risk, quality etc. To infer, as some
studies have done, that a high proportion of Treers (1995) missing trade
(missing in the sense that trade between nations generally falls far short
of what gravity models predict) is due to horizontal regulatory barriers is
probably incorrect. Indeed, national regulations in the presence of trade
and the absence of international cooperation are actually likely to lead to
over-regulation of standards which increases, rather than reducing, trade
volumes. There is some empirical evidence to support this view, such as
Moenius(1999) nding that increasing numbers of quantitative regulations
tend to be correlated with increasing volumes of both imports and exports.
It may well be likely that regulation will be higher in sectors or subsectors
which are dominated by imports: however, our analysis would suggest that
this is more likely to be for reasons of raising consumer utility. Where the
cost of such regulations falls largely upon foreign rms there is an incentive
to over-regulate (there is a parallel with the tax competition literature, see eg
Mieszkowski and Zodrow, 1989 ). However, this over-regulation will probably
increase, not decrease trade volumes.
In the light of these arguments, it may be that policymakers have been
too ready to view quality regulations as a trade protection issue, to be dealt
with through international trade negotiations. It may be more appropriate to
view it as an issue of international policy coordination, to avoid a natural bias
towards overregulation where production is global but regulation is national.
As for the recommendation (eg Lutz) that mutual recognition is always a
welfare-improving response to trade-induced strategic distortions, some cau-
tions must be added. When standards are reduced by producers for classical
oligopoly reasons, introducing mutual recognition may lead regulators to side
with their own producers, and cause a downward bias in quality: this e¤ect
has been missed in previous studies .
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Appendix: Figures
Figure 1: Imposition of a minimum quality standard QR by a regulator. Qu and Yu are the
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